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In the last few weeks thousands, possibly millions, of demonstrators on the streets of 
Cairo and Tunis have called for the ouster of aging, authoritarian leaders, just as crowds 
gathered a few years ago in Tbilisi, Bishkek and Kyiv. While some similarities between 
the events in Egypt and Tunisia this year and the Color Revolutions of 2003-2005 are 
evident, there are key differences as well.  
Perhaps the most significant difference between 2011 in Egypt and Tunisia and the Color 
Revolutions in the former Soviet Union is that the Egyptian and Tunisian leaderships, 
headed by Hosni Mubarak and Zine el Abidine Ben Ali respectively, were far more 
authoritarian and brutal than their counterparts in Georgia, Kyrgyzstan and Ukraine. The 
Color Revolutions occurred in more semi-democratic contexts, in which the regimes led 
by Eduard Shevardnadze in Georgia, Askar Akayev in Kyrgyzstan and Leonid Kuchma 
in Ukraine allowed for more media and political freedom, and were generally less 
repressive, than authorities in Egypt or Tunisia. 
The Color Revolutions led to a model for regime change that was based on an electoral 
breakthrough in which ballot fraud became the focal point around which the civic and 
political opposition could rally. In Egypt and Tunisia, however events were not 
precipitated by stolen elections, but by more ordinary occurrences, suggesting that the 
electoral breakthrough model is only possible in countries where there is some degree of 
political pluralism.  
There was also a geopolitical element to the Color Revolutions that is largely lacking in 
today's events in North Africa. The Color Revolutions were tied to the Bush-era "freedom 
agenda" and occurred in countries that had been the beneficiaries of ample US democracy 
assistance. Additionally, governments in Russia and other non-democratic regimes in that 
region sought to characterize the Color Revolutions as American plots, while the Bush 
administration sought credit for its role in bringing democracy to the region.  
In the Color Revolutions, the United States was viewed as being on the side of the 
revolutionaries, and was widely believed to have an almost magical role in organizing the 
opposition, spreading democracy, funding various organizations and the like. These days, 
social networking technology has displaced the United States as the apparent catalyst for 
protest. It is Twitter, Facebook and similar platforms, rightfully or not, that are perceived 
as the magic explanatory variable, working behind-the-scenes to foster political change in 
both Egypt and Tunisia.  
The lack of mention of the Color Revolutions in discussions about events in Egypt and 
Tunisia is due in part to the fate of the Color Revolutions themselves. Democratic 
 2
backsliding in Georgia, the implosion of the Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan and the 
defeat of the Orange Revolution at the polls in Ukraine all suggest that the Color 
Revolution phenomenon was not as powerful as it originally seemed in the early years of 
the 21st century. Today the story of the Color Revolutions is defined at least as much by 
the resilience of undemocratic regimes and institutions, as it is by democratic 
breakthroughs. The euphoria and excitement that greeted the revolutionary events a few 
years ago in the former Soviet sphere seem irrelevant today. 
Nonetheless, the central lessons of the Color Revolutions have direct bearing on Tunisia 
and Egypt. The Color Revolutions demonstrated that when a leader has been too corrupt, 
unresponsive, dishonest and undemocratic for too long, getting rid of that leader is not 
only possible, but appears almost unstoppable once popular frustrations pass a certain 
point. The sense of inevitability about Mubarak's tenure as Egypt's leader coming to an 
end is not dissimilar, for example, to what was felt on the streets of Tbilisi in November 
of 2003. 
The period following the Color Revolutions showed that driving an authoritarian-minded 
leader from power is far easier to accomplish than the task of building a new, stable 
political order — one that is open and not rotten to the core with corruption. Georgia, 
Kyrgyzstan and Ukraine have all struggled greatly and encountered only limited success 
in their respective democratization efforts. A similar challenge now confronts Tunisia, 
and will almost certainly face Egypt in the near future.  
While civil society advocates all over the world should be happy to see Ben Ali and 
Mubarak depart from power, celebrating recent events in North Africa as a democratic 
breakthrough is premature. There is still a lot of hard work to be done. For the United 
States, viewed as the deus ex machina in the Color Revolutions and as the dictators' 
patron in North Africa, the challenge will be to find a way to become part of this process, 
and to become relevant to political development in post-Mubarak Egypt and post-Ben Ali 
Tunisia. 
Editor's note:  
Lincoln Mitchell is an Associate Research Scholar at Columbia University's Harriman 
Institute. He is a frequent commenter on political development in the former Soviet 
Union and is currently writing a book on the Color Revolutions.  
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